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Abstract 
 
In Pelota matches, games with two mutually exclusive and exhaustive outcomes, bets on the 
winner are made between viewers through a middleman who receives 16% of the finally paid 
amount. In this paper after the description of the way bets are made in the market we analyze 
what we call the general odds rule. Analyzing the way odds are fixed in the market we find that 
assuming equal return on bets there are biases in the market. Moreover, we find profitable 
betting strategies even taking commissions into account. 
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1 Introduction 
 
We fill a gap in the literature by studying the very attractive betting system used in Pelota 
games in Navarra, the Basque Country and La Rioja. In what follows we call this the Pelota 
betting system. Before presenting the main work we would like to give a brief introduction 
about the Pelota games and the betting system. 
 
Most authors who have studied the origins of the Basque sport of pelota believe that it is linked 
to the Medieval hand-ball game of jeu de paume or “real tennis”. The history of this game was 
passed down orally, so the first written references to it do not appear until relatively late. In the 
18th century the game began to die out in France, Italy and England, but it grew more popular 
in the Basque Country, where increased economic prosperity led to the building of more courts.1 
 
Although there is evidence of betting on ball games in ancient times, there is no evidence of 
what type of wagers were made. We do not know when the betting system currently used on the 
pelota courts of the Basque Country first came into being, but we can say that no evidence has 
been found of the system outside this region. The rules of the system were traditionally not 
written down but passed on orally, which makes it harder to study. We have found a similar 
betting system that has been recently implemented on the Internet. The betting system followed 
in Betfair is similar to the Pelota betting system in that bettors can make as many bets as they 
want to provided that there is another bettor on the other side, and the market maker takes a 
percentage of the money as a commission. The main difference with the Pelota betting system 
is the odds scale. 
 
In America a different kind of game known as Jai-Alai or Cesta–Punta can also be seen. Jai-alai 
originated from the version of Pelota called Cesta Punta but the sport is now different. Bets 
are also made in Jai-Alai but the betting system in America is totally different from the system 
described here.  
 
Here we study the efficiency in this market. We take advantage of the peculiarities of the betting 
system to make some assumptions that allow us to analyze what we will call the general odds 
rule analyse. Analyzing the way odds are determined in this market we will find inefficiencies 
in the sense that profitable betting strategies are found. In Section 2 we describe the game and 
the betting system, a complete description can be found in Llorente, L. and J.M. Aizpurua 
(2006) where a theoretical explanation of the existence of bets in the market is shown. In 
Section 3 we take advantage of the peculiarities of the betting system to make some 
assumptions that allow us to analyze what we will call the general odds rule. Analyzing the 
way odds are determined in this market, we find inefficiencies in the sense that profitable 
betting strategies are found. Finally, we present some conclusions in Section 4.  
                                                 
1 Data obtained on-line from the paper “Origen y desarrollo de las distintas modalidades del juego de la 
pelota vasca” on the website of the conference Confederación Internacional del Juego de la Pelota; 
http://www.cijb.org.  
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2 A description of the Pelota betting system 
 
All Pelota (“Pelota Vasca”) matches are played by two teams: reds (R) and blues (B) play 
against each other by hitting a ball in turn against a wall on a court called a frontón. The team 
that serves first is chosen by throwing a coin. When a team makes an error the opponent scores 
one point and serves to start the next point. The team that reaches a pre-set number of points 
wins the match.  
On these matches a bet is described by two quantities that inform on the odds: a quantity of 
money the bettor loses when he fails to predict the winning team and an amount of money the 
bettor wins if he guesses right. Bets can be made during the whole match, so while points are 
scored, odds change. A bettor can place as many bets as he wants to, provided someone can be 
found to accept those bets .  
This betting system is popular in the Basque Country, Navarra and La Rioja, where several 
types of Pelota game are played. There are slight differences between the different types. In 
what follows we will study the betting system in a particular game called remonte. The rules of 
the betting system are not written, thus all our explanations are based on information obtained at 
the frontón. More specifically, our study is based in the information collected by at the Euskal 
Jai Berri, a frontón where the Pelota game played is remonte. This frontón was chosen because 
it has screens on which one can see the odds at which one can bet at all times during the game, a 
peculiarity that is very helpful for obtaining field data. 
  
2.1 A brief description of REMONTE  
 
Remonte is a type of Pelota. It is played on a frontón which consists of a playing court limited 
by three walls at the front, the left and the back. The frontón is about 54 meters long, 12 meters 
wide and 11 meters high. 
In this game reds and blues hit a ball with a wicker scoop attached to the players’ hands called 
the cesta. The teams usually have two players each but may occasionally have one or three. 
Each team has to hit the ball in turn, starting with the team chosen by the field judge tossing a 
coin. When one player fails to hit correctly the opponents score one point and serve the ball in 
order to start the next point. The first team to reach 40 points wins the match. 
To play a point, each team has two possibilities. The first and most common one is to hit the 
ball against the front wall so that the ball bounces on the floor inside the limits marked. The 
second one is to hit the ball against the left wall so that it rebounds against the front wall and 
then bounces on the floor inside the court. Once the ball hits the front wall, the other team is 
allowed to hit the ball either before or after it touches the floor (only once) or even after  it 
bounces off the back wall.  
Each game usually lasts around one hour. 
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2.2 A brief description of the betting market in REMONTE 
 
Throughout the game, you are allowed to place as many bets as you want. In each bet you chose 
either the red team or the blue and wager an amount of money against another spectator that 
chooses the other team and wagers another amount of money (these amounts will be called the 
odds). If you guess right you win the money that your opponent loses.  
 
For example, if you bet 100 euros on the reds against an opponent who bets 100 on the blues 
and the blues win the match, you pay your opponent 100 euros. 
But all bets are placed through a middleman who works for the organisers and takes 16% of the 
winnings of the successful bettor, so in the previous example you pay your opponent 100 euros 
but he only receives 84, because the middleman takes 16. 
 
Throughout the Remonte match a screen (see Table 1) shows the effective odds in the market 
and the current score . 
 
 
 odds score OR is the amount a bettor risks by betting on reds.  
(reds) OR sr   OB is the amount a bettor risks by betting on blues. 
(blues) OB sb    sr (sb) is the red (blue) team´s score. 
Table 1.The Screen
 
Picture 1: The reds and the blues playing a Pelota game on a frontón.  
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The odds consist of two numbers, with the bigger one always being 100 euros and the smaller 
one varying between 2 and 100 as points are played. Generally the smaller odd is one of the set 
{2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 15, 20, 25, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100}. 
 
 
In the example in Table 2 red team has scored 5 and blue team 2. The odds are 100 to 80, 
denoted by (100,80). The bettor who bets on reds risks 100 euro to win 80 and the one who bets 
on blues risks 80 euro to win 100. From now on we will follow this convention in describing the 
various bets. Bets are always between spectators, so if one spectator places a bet on red there 
must be another who bets on blue. What happens when the game is over? 
 
bet on reds A bettor on reds will loose 100 euros if blues win the match. Otherwise, if 
reds win the match the bettor will win 80 euros minus the 16 percent commission, i.e. 
67.2 euros.    
 
bet on blues A bettor on blues will loose 80 euros if reds win the match. Otherwise, if 
blue wins the match the bettor will win 100 euros minus 16 per cent, i.e. 84 euros. 
 
This describes a single bet. A bettor can make as many bets as he wants to, provided that there 
is someone on the other side who will take his bets. For example, with the same screen as in 
Table 2, if a bettor places ten bets on the reds he will loose 100*10=1000 euros if blues win the 
match. Otherwise, if reds win the match the bettor will win 67.2*10=670 euros. 
 
Moreover, a bettor can bet at different times during the game, choosing one team in one period 
and the other team in another. Therefore the result above is concerning the particular bet 
analyzed here. 
 
2.3 The way the odds are fixed in the market 
 
In remonte there is an “auctioneer” who posts the odds that appear on the screen. We call him 
the coordinator. He is usually someone who has been a player and a middleman for many 
years. This man is an expert on remonte, possibly the man who knows most about the game at 
the frontón. He chooses the hand-made balls used by players to play the match, and he posts the 
odds at which people bet. He sits in front of a computer, in a privileged place behind the 
spectators, where he can follow the match and see the spectators and all the middlemen. He 
posts the odds that appear on the screens. When a team scores a point it is closer to winning, and 
is thus more likely to win the match than before scoring. Thus the money a bettor risks betting 
on that team should be higher to maintain the expected value of the bet constant.  
 
 odds score 
(reds) 100 5 
(blues) 80 2 
Table 2. An example
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There are some general rules that the coordinator follows to set and change the odds: 
 
If there is no reason to think of either team as the favourite just before the match starts, the score 
is zero-zero and the odds (OR, OB) are (100, 100). If there is a favourite team, the odds may be 
different. For example, if red is favourite, with the same score we could have odds (OR, OB) of 
(100, 80). 
 
Once it is clear what the initial odds are, the match goes on and points are scored. The general 
rule is that the difference between the amounts of the odds increases by 10 euros on the team 
that has just scored a point, keeping in mind that the larger amount in the odds is always 100. 
 
If the odds differ by more than 70 (100, 30), they change by only 5 euros for each point. If they 
differ by more than 90, the odds change by only 2 euros for each point. When one team has 
accumulated approximately 30 points, the change in the odds doubles for each point then 
scored, and trebles or quadruples when the end of the match is very near. For example if the 
score is (38, 39) the odds would be (40, 100). 
 
Of course, sometimes these rules are modified because of changes in supply and demand among 
spectators. When a middleman finds two people who want to bet at odds different from those on 
the screen, the middleman has to ask the coordinator to change the odds on the screen so that 
he can print the receipts for the bettors. There are no bets on the frontón at odds different from 
those on the screens. In general the odds vary mainly as the above rules indicate. 
It is important to realize that the coordinator works for the firm that organizes Pelota matches, 
so his goal could be described as making people bet as much as possible. So we can confidently 
assume that the odds he posts are those at which people are willing to bet the most, i.e. the 
equilibrium odds where there is no excess of demand of bets . 
 
3 The general odds rule  
 
In this section we take advantage of the peculiarities of the betting system to make some 
assumptions that allow us to analyze what we will call the general odds rule.  
 
We were told by the coordinator in the market that games are arranged in such a way that the 
chances of winning for each team are as similar as possible. From this peculiarity we assume 
that, in general, the probability of scoring the following point by each team is 50:50. As we will 
see,  given the score this assumption allows us to obtain each team’s theoretical probability of 
winning; see the following subsection 3.1. 
The coordinator also told us that he follows a general rule to set odds in the market so long as 
nothing atypical happens (where “atypical” means that there is an excess of people willing to 
bet on one color). Odds differ from those of the general rule if for example it can be seen that a 
player has lost his ability or something happens that causes more bettors to be willing to bet on 
one of the teams. From that we could infer that odds in the general rule are the equilibrium odds 
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(there is no excess of willingness to bet on one of the two teams) when players have the same 
probability to score the following point. Therefore we will study the general odds rule as the 
equilibrium price in the market when the probability of scoreing the following point by each 
team is 50:50. From these market odds, and under some assumptions that will be explained in 
the subsection “Teams’ probabilities of winning the match inferred from market odds”, we can 
obtain the probabilities inferred from market odds.  
 
We will compare the theoretical probability with the probability inferred from market odds to 
check if there are biases in the market. 
 
3.1 Teams’ theoretical probabilities of winning the match 
 
Assuming that the likelihood of a team scoring the following point is the same throughout the 
match, the theoretical probability of the team’s winning the match can be derived at any time. 
With no loss of generality we perform such a calculation for the reds. Given the reds’ score, sr, 
the blues’ score, sb, and the reds’ probability of scoring a point at any moment during the match, 
p, the reds’ probability of winning the match, pr, is given by 
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This equation is obtained by the addition of as many amounts as there are different possible final 
scores where the reds are the winners (i is the number of points the blues could score, from 0 to 39-
sb). For each of these possible final scores, the amount added is obtained by multiplying the 
probability of this final score by the number of different ways in which it can be reached.  
 
In Pelota games the probability of each team scoring the following point and the probability of 
wining the match are unknown but we know that matches are arranged so that the chances of 
winning for each team are as similar as possible according to the subjective perception of the 
organizer of the match: when one team is superior the odds are shortened by using match-balls 
that favour the worse team and so on. When one team is superior the other may even be allowed 
to use one more player. Thus, for the sake of simplicity, we set the reds’ probability of scoring 
the following point at p = 0.5. This in conjunction with the equation above, (1), allows us to 
calculate, for a given score, the reds’ probability of wining the match, pr, 
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We call  this the reds’ theoretical probability of winning the match. 
These theoretical probabilities for some possible scores are shown below. 
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3.2 Teams’ probabilities of winning the match inferred from 
market odds 
 
In this subsection we try to analyze the market with orthodox methods, here in particular we 
analyze the general odds rule followed in the Pelota betting system under certain assumptions 
that may be somewhat strong, but are made in studies of other wagering markets. Thus we start 
by assuming that bettors are expected value maximizers. A condition for equilibrium is that the 
expected value of a bet on the reds should be equal to the expected value of a bet on the blues, 
because if not all bettors prefer to bet on the colour with the higher return. In  the section 
“Efficiency of the general odds rule assuming equal return on bets” we study the probability 
inferred from the market assuming equal returns on each bet and we obtain that there is a 
difference between the probability inferred from market odds and the theoretical probability of a 
team winning the match. Low probabilities are overestimated while high probabilities are 
underestimated. 
In these markets there are commissions, so the equilibrium condition of equal return of bets 
implies that each bet has a negative expected return. Therefore it seems more convenient to 
introduce the less restrictive restriction of not allowing profitable bets in the market. This is 
done in “Efficiency of the general odds rule assuming no profitable bets” where we check what 
the probabilities inferred from market odds must be to satisfy this less restrictive restriction of 
no profitable bets, i.e. to satisfy the condition of expected value of a bet lower than or at most 
equal to zero. Comparing this probability inferred from market odds with the actual 
probabilities we find that in these markets there are profitable betting strategies. 
 
Table 1: “The reds’ theoretical probabilities of winning the match given the current score.”  
(sr,sb) Theoretical pr 
(1,0) 0,545 
(2,0) 0,5901 
(3,0) 0,6345 
(4,0) 0,6778 
(5,0) 0,7193 
(6,0) 0,7586 
(7,0) 0,7952 
(8,0) 0,8288 
(9,0) 0,859 
(10,0) 0,8858 
(11,0) 0,9091 
(12,0) 0,929 
(13,0) 0,9456 
(14,0) 0,9592 
(15,0) 0,97 
(16,0) 0,9785 
(17,0) 0,985 
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3.2.1 The general odds rule 
 
As already mentioned, for each score we can derive the odds in the market by applying the 
general odds rule. The table below shows some scores and their corresponding market odds . 
 
 
 
3.2.2 Efficiency of the general odds rule assuming equal return on bets 
 
Now that we know the odds in the market for each score, we can derive the probabilities 
inferred from these odds as follows.  If the market is efficient, where “efficiency” means that the 
expected returns are equal on the various bets (see the different meanings of “efficiency” in 
Sauer, R.D. (1998), p. 2024),  then equation (2) should happen. 
 
Proposition 1 A Pelota betting market has equal returns on bets if equation (2) is satisfied. 
 
pr
H1-prL
=
OR
OB   (2) 
 
where pr is the likelihood of the reds winning the match, OR is the money risked in a bet on the 
reds and OB is the money risked in a bet on the blues. 
 
Table 2: “General odds rule.”   
Score Odds 
(sr,sb) (OR,OB) 
(1,0) (100,90) 
(2,0) (100,80) 
(3,0) (100,70) 
(4,0) (100,60) 
(5,0) (100,50) 
(6,0) (100,40) 
(7,0) (100,30) 
(8,0) (100,25) 
(9,0) (100,20) 
(10,0) (100,15) 
(11,0) (100,10) 
(12,0) (100,8) 
(13,0) (100,6) 
(14,0) (100,4) 
(15,0) (100,2) 
(16,0) (100,2) 
(17,0) (100,2) 
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Proof. Denote by VER the expected value of a bet on the reds, and VEB the expected value of a 
bet on the blues. We know that VER = pr OB (1 - t) – (1 - pr) OR, and VEB = (1 - pr) OR (1 – t) – pr 
OB where t is the middlemen’s commission. If the market is efficient the two expected values 
should be equal, thus pr OB (1 - t) – (1 - pr) OR = (1 - pr) OR (1 - t) – pr OB, and by operating we 
obtain
pr
H1- prL
=
H2- tL OR
H2- tL OB , which proves that condition (2) is true no matter what the 
commission is. 
 
Rearranging equation (2); ( )r
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The probability inferred from the odds is obtained by equation (3). These probabilities are 
shown in Table 3 below. 
 
   
In Table 4 below we put together four columns: first of all the score, secondly the market odds 
for each score applying the general odds rule, thirdly the reds’ theoretical probability of 
winning the match obtained for each score, and finally the reds’ probability of winning the 
match obtained from the market odds by applying equation (3).  
 
Table 3: “The probability of the reds winning the match inferred from market odds 
assuming equal return of bets. It is  obtained by equation (3).” 
Odds pr derived  from 
(OR,OB) market odds = pr 
(100,90) 0,5263 
(100,80) 0,5556 
(100,70) 0,5882 
(100,60) 0,625 
(100,50) 0,6667 
(100,40) 0,7143 
(100,30) 0,7692 
(100,25) 0,8 
(100,20) 0,8333 
(100,15) 0,8696 
(100,10) 0,9091 
(100,8) 0,9259 
(100,6) 0,9434 
(100,4) 0,9615 
(100,2) 0,9804 
(100,2) 0,9804 
(100,2) 0,9804 
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In Figure 1 a scatterplot is shown of the probabilities inferred from markets odds, rπ , against 
the corresponding theoretical probability, rp . 
 
Score Odds Theoretical pr derived  from 
(sr,sb) (OR,OB)  pr market odds 
(1,0) (100,90) 0,545 0,5263 
(2,0) (100,80) 0,5901 0,5556 
(3,0) (100,70) 0,6345 0,5882 
(4,0) (100,60) 0,6778 0,625 
(5,0) (100,50) 0,7193 0,6667 
(6,0) (100,40) 0,7586 0,7143 
(7,0) (100,30) 0,7952 0,7692 
(8,0) (100,25) 0,8288 0,8 
(9,0) (100,20) 0,859 0,8333 
(10,0) (100,15) 0,8858 0,8696 
(11,0) (100,10) 0,9091 0,9091 
(12,0) (100,8) 0,929 0,9259 
(13,0) (100,6) 0,9456 0,9434 
(14,0) (100,4) 0,9592 0,9615 
(15,0) (100,2) 0,97 0,9804 
(16,0) (100,2) 0,9785 0,9804 
(17,0) (100,2) 0,985 0,9804 
(0,1) (90,100) 0,455 0,4737 
(0,2) (80,100) 0,4099 0,4444 
(0,3) (70,100) 0,3655 0,4118 
(0,4) (60,100) 0,3222 0,375 
(0,5) (50,100) 0,2807 0,3333 
(0,6) (40,100) 0,2414 0,2857 
(0,7) (30,100) 0,2048 0,2308 
(0,8) (25,100) 0,1712 0,2 
(0,9) (20,100) 0,141 0,1667 
(0,10) (15,100) 0,1142 0,1304 
(0,11) (10,100) 0,0909 0,0909 
(0,12) (8,100) 0,071 0,0741 
(0,13) (6,100) 0,0544 0,0566 
(0,14) (4,100) 0,0408 0,0385 
(0,15) (2,100) 0,03 0,0196 
(0,16) (2,100) 0,0215 0,0196 
(0,17) (2,100) 0,015 0,0196 
Table 4: “The probability of the reds winning; theoretical and derived from market odds.” 
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It can be seen in the graph above that for low theoretical probabilities the probability inferred 
from market odds is higher, and for high probabilities the probability inferred from market odds 
is lower than is actually the case. Thus this analysis, as well as other studies, supports the long-
shot bias. Empirical evidence on horseracing is found in Dowie, J. (1976), Henery, R.J. (1985), 
Thaler, R.H. and W.T. Ziemba (1988), and Vaughan, L. and D. Paton (1997). And empirical 
evidence of the long-shot bias is found in greyhound in Cain, M., D. Law, and D.A. Peel (1992). 
 
3.2.3 Efficiency of the general odds rule assuming no profitable bets 
 
Nevertheless, as there are commissions, t = 0.16, when a bet takes place both bettors’ expected 
values add up to a negative amount. Thus when analysing efficiency it is more convenient to ask 
for no possible profitable bets in the market. This implies that the expected value of a bet, both 
on the reds and on the blues, has to be lower than or equal to zero and, as shown in the 
following proposition, this implies that both equations (4) and (5) have to be fulfilled. 
 
Proposition 3 In a Pelota betting market there are no profitable bets iff 
pr § OR
OB H1-tL+OR  (4) 
and 
Figure 1. 
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OR H1-tL
OB +ORH1-tL
§ pr
. (5) 
 
Proof. The expected value of a bet on the reds lower than zero and the expected value of a bet o 
on the blues lower than zero implies  
pr OBH1- tL -H1 - prL OR § 0 (6) 
and 
H1- prL ORH1-tL - pr OB §0 (7) 
Respectively. Rearranging (6) and (7) we obtain equations (4) and (5). 
 
We represent equations (4) and (5) first in two separate graphs, Figure 2 and Figure 3, and  
then together in Figure 4. 
 
 
 
Given a score, we know both the theoretical probability of winning for the reds (applying 
equation (1)), and the market odds (applying the general odds rule). Therefore in Figure 2 the 
horizontal axis shows the theoretical probability and the vertical axis shows the upperbound 
probability inferred from market odds (applying equation (4)). The marked area corresponds to 
the probabilities inferred from markets odds assuming that the expected value of a bet on the 
reds is lower than zero. 
Figure 2. pr assuming that the expected value of a bet on the reds is at most zero (4). 
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Given a score, we know both the theoretical probability of winning for the reds (applying 
equation (1)), and the market odds (applying the general odds rule). Therefore in Figure 3 the 
horizontal axis shows the theoretical probability of winning for the reds. The vertical axis 
shows the lower bound probability inferred from market odds (applying equation (5)). The 
marked area corresponds to the probabilities inferred from markets odds assuming that the 
expected value of a bet on the blues is lower than zero. 
 
As both conditions (4) and (5) are necessary for the market to have no possible profitable bets, 
the probability inferred from market odds should be in the area between the two lines in the 
following graph. 
 
Figure 3. pr assuming expected value of a bet on the blues is at most zero (5).  
pr s.t. EVb  < 0 (t = 0,16)
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From Figure 4 above it can be seen that there are odds in the market at which profitable bets 
could be made. It can be seen that when the theoretical probability of the reds winning is {.68, 
.72, .75} it is profitable to bet on the reds: the odds are respectively {(100, 60), (100, 50), (100, 
40)}. Symmetrically, when the theoretical probability of the reds winning is {.24, .28, .32} the 
odds are respectively {(40, 100), (50, 100), (60, 100)}, and it is profitable to bet on the blues 
whose probabilities of winning are complementary. Overall, when the odds differ by 40, 50 or 
60 euros, it is profitable to bet on the favourite.  
 
Woodland, L. M., and B. M. Woodland (1994) find deviation from efficiency in the baseball 
betting market but insufficient to allow for profitable betting strategies when commissions are 
considered. Here we find profitable betting strategies taking commissions into account. 
  
If the expected value of a bet on the reds must be equal to the expected value of a bet on the 
blues, equation (2), the probability inferred from market odds is just in the middle of the area 
between the two lines, a probability for which the expected value of a bet is negative. This is 
shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. 
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4 Summary and conclusion 
 
We have described the Pelota betting system. We point out two peculiarities that differentiate it 
from other well-known betting systems. Unlike pari-mutuel betting systems the odds in a 
Pelota market are definitively set when the bet takes place. Bets are arranged by means of 
middlemen but, unlike what happens in bookmaking, for a bet to be placed one bettor bets on 
one team and another bettor bets on the other team, thus the middleman does not bet at all. 
We have found a similar betting system that has been recently implemented on the Internet. The 
betting system followed in Betfair is similar to the Pelota betting system in that bettors can 
make as many bets as they want to provided that there is another bettor on the other side, and 
the market maker takes a percentage of the money as a commission. The main difference with 
the Pelota betting system is the odds scale. 
 
Here we seek to analyze the market with orthodox methods, and in particular we analyze the 
general odds rule followed in the Pelota betting system under certain assumptions that, 
though they may be somewhat strong, are made in studies of other wagering markets. Thus we 
start by assuming that bettors are expected value maximizers. A condition for equilibrium is that 
the expected value of a bet on the reds must be equal to the expected value of a bet on the blues, 
because if not all bettors prefer to bet on the colour with the higher return. We study the 
probability inferred from the market odds assuming equal returns on each bet and we obtain that 
there is a difference between the probability inferred from market odds and the theoretical 
probability of a team winning the match. Low probabilities are overestimated while high 
probabilities are underestimated. Therefore in this the Pelota betting market we find evidence of 
the long-shot bias. 
 
In these markets there are commissions, so the equilibrium condition of equal returns on bets 
implies that each bet has a negative expected return. Thus it seems more convenient to introduce 
the less restrictive restriction of not allowing profitable bets in the market. We check what the 
probability inferred from market odds is to satisfy this less restrictive restriction of no profitable 
bets, i.e. to satisfy the condition of expected value of a bet lower than or at most equal to zero. 
We obtain that the probability inferred from market odds must be in an area satisfying 
inequalities (4) and (5) on pages 12 and 13. We find that under the assumption of no profitable 
bets there are odds at which subjective probabilities differ from real ones. Thus we have found 
that there are odds in the market at which profitable bets could be made; when the odds differ by 
40, 50 or 60 euros, it is profitable to bet on the favourite. 
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